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In this article, I set out in brief detail how the
prosecuting authorities in Italy worked with their
counterparts in Romania to investigate a large
and damaging phishing operation, organized by
two criminal gangs in Romania.
Background
The Phish & Chip operation outlined in this article can
be described as a second generation investigation
about phishing. In Italy, the first phishing e-mail
occurred in March 2005. It was a little attack against
Poste Italiane, the government-owned postal service
that offers financial services across Italy. I had the luck
to coordinate the first investigation, which began in May
2005, when we had a bigger attack against Banca Intesa
and three other Italian banks that had their registered
offices in Milan. At that time, it was not understood why
the money was not moving directly abroad (from where
the phishing e-mails were sent), but from the defrauded
bank accounts to other people living in Italy. We
searched ten homes across the country, and discovered
how the money was transferred abroad, in particular to
St Petersburg in the Russian Federation, using the
Western Union money transfer system. The thieves sent
two types of e-mail. The phishing e-mail was sent out to
obtain the data of legitimate on-line current accounts of
those that responded. Another e-mail was sent, offering
work to people as a financial manager. When they had a
sufficient number of ‘financial mangers’ and the details
of a sufficient number of on-line bank accounts, the
thieves then authorized the transfer of funds from the
victim’s account, and paid it in to the account of the
newly-recruited financial manager. When the money had
been successfully transferred, the thieves then directed
the financial manager to transfer the funds abroad.
It is for this reason that it is important to profile a
cybercrime during the investigation: in this case, as
soon as we found out how this new criminal method
worked, I reached, in my capacity as the Italian Judicial
Authority, an agreement with Western Union Inc. in the
United States of America. They told us it was the first
time any prosecuting authority had approached them,
and we reached an agreement2 called ‘international
seizure warrant’. According to the agreement, Western
Union was requested to delay the suspect money
transfers for 48 hours, which gave sufficient time to
verify whether the transfer was genuine. We provided
Western Union with a list of the names of people, and
destination countries, and they contacted us, in real
time, to give us the MTCN (Money Transfer Control
Number)3 of the suspect transaction. This was a very
demanding exercise, and it was partly thanks to another
group of the Military Financial Police in Milan (Gruppo
Repressione Frodi - Antifraud Group), in particular to
Gerardo Costabile and Giuseppe Mazzaraco, over
250,000.00 euro was seized in two months, all of which
was intended for the Russian Federation.
Further developments
In 2006, we had the first case of people entering Italy
from East Europe to collect money by themselves from
phishing attacks, rather than through Western Union
(whose operations were monitored by us). In Milan, we
arrested two Latvians whose purpose was to open bank
accounts in several banks with false passports and
1 This article has been prepared from a presentation
given by the author at the Digital PhishNet
Conference 2008 in San Diego California on 30
September 2008 (many thanks to Luisa and Valeria
Viganò for the review). The power point
presentation is available at
http://www.osservatoriofinanziario.it/of/DPN2008_
Phish&Chip.pdf. For more information about
phishing and misappropriation of digital identity in
Italy, see F. Cajani, G. Costabile and G. Mazzaraco,
Indagini informatiche e sicurezza bancaria
(‘Phishing and digital identity theft. IT
investigation and bank security’), (Giuffrè editore,
Milan, 2008) and http://www.osservatorio
finanziario.it/of/newslarge.asp?id=636.
2 It can be considered a ‘gentleman’s agreement’
rather than one issued under articles 12 and 13 of
the Convention of the United Nations against
Transnational Organized Crime. Every time we get
the information required from Western Union, we
make a request to a judge to seize the suspect
money transfer, in accordance with Italian Law.
3 This is the numerical code of the transfer, formed
by ten digits, given to the sender of the transfer,
and the beneficiary must have it to simplify the
transfer identification process at the moment of
the money is collected.
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documentation. In the beginning of 2007, a new method
of cybercrime was immediately discovered through the
Phish & Chip operation. To begin, it is worth setting out
how the cybercrime worked: the individual aims to
remain in their own country, sending phishing e-mails
and receiving money without using the Western Union.
They can do this with a large number of prepaid credit
cards bought in Italy by a group of people directly
managed by the criminal, and is described in more
detail below.
The Phish & Chip operation
The Phish & Chip operation started in February 2007,
when the managers in charge of preventing fraud at
Poste Italiane reported some unusual operations
concerning prepaid credit cards (called Postepay cards4)
bought in Milan. I was responsible for coordinating the
investigation held by the Provincial Command of the
Military Financial Police in Milan, the Guardia di Finanza,
Gruppo Pronto Impiego,5 with the cooperation of the
Romanian investigators of the brigata de combattere a
criminalitatii organizate (the brigade to combat
organised crime).
The first step of the investigation was to discover the
meaning of this unusual buying pattern. Two connected
organizations were identified, made up of Italian and
Romanian citizens. The operative framework was the
same: members of the organization activated the
prepaid cards (they also used Banca Intesa cards, called
Intesa flash cards); the phisher sent e-mails, and
collected the relevant data to enable them to gain
access to on-line bank accounts; the ‘boss’, whose duty
was to collect the prepaid cards, paying 50.00 to 100.00
euro for each, gave the phisher instructions in order to
prepay the cards, and to withdraw the money once each
card was topped up. The method used was called the
‘Casinò system’. The withdrawal of illegally transferred
funds was carried out through a particular mechanism:
some of the members of the criminal organization went
to Italian and foreign casinos (mainly in Germany,
Austria and Greece) and they purchased ‘chips’ for the
maximum permitted amount with the cards ‘charged’
illegally. In this way they managed to launder 3,000.00
euro per withdrawal, instead of the mere 250.00 euro 
at ATMs.
Interception of mobile telephones
Further to the monitoring of the prepaid card activations
within the territory of Milan, we analysed all the IP
addresses of the illegal on-line bank transfer
operations, in order to find – as it later happened – a
vulnerability in the framework used by the phishers. At
the beginning of the investigation, success seemed a
long way off: the criminal bosses used a number of
aliases and sophisticated electronic tools. For instance,
the complete and accurate identification of one of the
bosses was obtained thanks to an intercepted
telephone conversation on 11 April 2007, during which
the person under investigation contacted a car dealer
and asked for information concerning the transfer of
ownership of a Porsche Boxster motor car purchased a
few weeks previously. A further investigation into the
ownership of the car showed that it belonged to the
wife of the person under investigation, and he had
underwritten, in her name, the insurance for the car. The
operators of the the Guardia di Finanza - Gruppo Pronto
Impiego (judicial police) investigated the credit card
used for the payment of the premiums of the insurance,
and the mobile telephone number given to the bank
when the current account was opened that was linked
to the credit card. They not only made use of false
documents, but one shop in Milan, prepared not to ask
questions, provided numerous SIM cards which were
registered to fictitious Greek citizens.
The mistake that led to the arrests 
The plan devised by the criminals was perfect in theory,
as in the film ‘The Italian Job’,6 when to achieve their
purpose, the English criminal gang manipulated the
computers that controlled the traffic lights in Turin,
causing the traffic to stop moving through the city,
enabling the thieves to effect an agile escape from the
Italian police. In this instance, and for a very short
period, the criminal association committing the crimes
used the same SIM card to carry out their illegal
activities via the internet as well as for the
conversations between the people taking part in the
crime. This mistake enabled us to intercept these
4 The prepaid ‘Postepay card’ is a payment or
withdrawal instrument that can be used in two
ways: either Postamat or Visa Electron. One of the
characteristics that make a Postepay card different
from the other credit cards, is that they can be
issued to the person requesting them, even if the
latter does not have a current bank account.
5 A number of people continuously offered important
contributions to the investigation, under the
direction of Major Edoardo Viti: Chief Mar. Davide
D’Agostino (Commander of the Section, who
moreover materially drafted most of the Judicial
Police’s informative reports), Chief Mar. Giuseppe
Gorgoni, Mar. Stefano Santoro and the Lance-
Corporal Massimo Raone.
6 Written by Troy Kennedy Martin, produced by
Michael Deeley, directed by Peter Collinson, music
composed by Quincy Jones, and released in 1969,
starring Michael Caine and Noel Coward.
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fellows (since we identified an IP address used by them
for the illegal operations over the internet) and to
continue the investigation successfully. It was for this
reason that the operation was called ‘Phish & Chip’.7 A
mixture of house searches, telephone interceptions and
the analysis of the content of internet chats that
occurred among the various targets in Italy and
Romania during the first phase of the investigation
guaranteed a precious collection of digital evidence and
important confirmation relevant to the investigative
hypothesis.
Execution of warrants of arrest
Five months after the operation began, in July 2007, the
Guardia di Finanza executed 26 warrants of arrest for
those people belonging to the two criminal associations
that took advantage of the home banking service
personal access codes of the customers of Poste
Italiane,8 and Banca Intesa, one of the most important
banks in Italy. The judge for the preliminary
investigations, Guido Salvini, indicated in the order of
custody, that this is:
… (l’attività) condotta dalla Procura di Milano e svolta
grazie ad accertamenti assai complessi, vista la
materia trattata, svolti con grande impegno dal
Gruppo Pronto Impiego della Guardia di Finanza di
Milano, costituisce forse il primo tentativo di
affrontare in modo organico sul piano investigativo ed
anche contestando reati associativi il fenomeno delle
organizzazioni criminali dedite sistematicamente
all’attività di phishing
… (activity) conducted by the Prosecutor of Milan and
carried out through very complex investigation, given
the subject matter, conducted with great commitment
by Gruppo Pronto Impiego of Guardia di Finanza di
Milano, is perhaps the first attempt to face the
phenomenon of the criminal organizations apt to the
systematic attempt of phishing in an organic manner,
both from the investigative point of view and also
contesting offences of association.
The operation received unexpected media coverage that
went beyond Italy,9 and it was described on Italian
television as ‘one of the most important Information
Technology investigation in Europe in the last years’.
The following charges were brought against 26 people:
criminal association, falsification of IT communication
content, unauthorized access to IT systems, aggravated
fraud, unauthorized use of credit cards.10
The closure of the first investigation 
All the members of the first of the two criminal
organizations had been living in Italy for a number of
years. The information system hacker of the first group
was a 22 years old Romanian boy. During his
questioning at the office of the Prosecutor, which lasted
most of the night, he confessed to sending e-mails as if
they had been sent by Poste Italiane, and to collecting
the data belonging to victims with e-mail addresses of
providers operating in Italy, but with servers based
abroad. The computer forensic analysis confirmed his
confession. Covering the four months of this first phase
of the investigation, fraudulent activity amounting to
250,000.00 euro was discovered by the investigators.
The continuation of the investigation
In April 2007, the investigators knew that the main
person responsible for the second organization was
returning to his home in Craiova, Romania. It was
extremely important to ensure there was excellent
cooperation between the Milan, Bucharest and Craiova
judicial authorities.11 The investigation was headed by
the commissary, Silviu Vacaru, who ensured the efficient
coordination and cooperation between the Italian
Guardia di Finanza and the Romanian police. We asked
for and obtained, using the necessary rogatory, the
7 In fact everything starts from the SIM card: its
internal chip gathers information that is updated
by the mobile telephone company. The information
contained in the chip provides a great deal of data
about the life of the SIM card: external data
concerning the calls and internet connections
made with the SIM card – that is, everything apart
from the name of the real holder, because in Milan
– as was shown (again) by this investigation – it is
possible to purchase false SIM cards activated in
the name of a third party at a very low price close
to the subway stations or in the area around the
central railway station.
8 During the first quarter of 2007, according to the
quarterly report concerning the phishing
phenomenon in Italy and drafted by Anti-phishing
Italia, the phishing attacks on the Poste Italiane
current account holders represented 87.11 per cent
of the total attacks in Italy: http://www.anti-
phishing.it.
9 For instance, see John Leyden, ‘Italian police net
26 in phishing takedown’ The Register, 16 July
2007, on-line at http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2007/07/16/phish_chip_arrests/.
10 Article 416 of the Italian Criminal Code (Codice
Penale) - Associazione per delinquere (criminal
association); Article 617-sexies of the Italian
Criminal Code (Codice Penale) - Falsificazione,
alterazione o soppressione del contenuto di
comunicazioni informatiche o telematiche
(falsification of IT communication content); Article
615ter of the Italian Criminal Code (Codice Penale)
– Accesso abusivo ad un sistema informatico o
telematico (unauthorized access to IT systems);
Article 640 paragraph 2 of the Italian Criminal Code
(Codice Penale) – truffa (aggravated fraud); Article
55 paragraph 9 of the Legislative Decree (Decreto
Legislativo) 21.11.2007 n. 231 (unauthorized use of
credit cards).
11 The investigation was headed by the commissary,
Silviu Vacaru, who ensured the efficient
coordination and cooperation between the Italian
Guardia di Finanza and the Romanian police. I
must here mention the sensitivity shown by
Florentina Longu, Chief Prosecutor of the
Investigative Direction for crimes of organized
crime and terrorism at the Dolj territorial Office, as
well as of Prosecutor Adrian Gluga.
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interception of communications in Romania.12
The exchange of information, often in real time,
between the investigators in Craiova and the officials of
the Guardia di Finanza in Milan, turned out to be of vital
importance for the identification and the subsequent
capture of the main person responsible, together with a
number of fugitives who escaped to Romania during the
July arrest. In the second phase of the operation, money
flows from Italy to Romania had been analyzed and
rebuilt: this enabled the fees that were paid to the
technical experts who participated in the crime to be
identified.
The two young Romanian phishers arrested 
Using the result of the Romanian interceptions, in
October 2007 the first of the two young Romanian
phishers was arrested in Craiova. Extradited to Italy,13 his
declarations were also useful to arrest a second young
man, who was much more expert and better than him.
In fact, they needed to ‘empty’ a bank account of
100,000.00 euro, and so they called another phisher,
well known in the young criminal underground because
he successfully took part in the Romanian Information
Technology Olympic Games in 2004. Besides this, we
arrived at his definitive identification because his details
were still available over the internet at the material
time.14 At this point, after having the confirmation of the
exact identification data from the Romanian judicial
authorities, another European arrest warrant was
requested – on 13 December 2007 – which was issued
by the judge for the preliminary investigation on 19
December 2007. Less than ten days later, the young
phisher was found at his house in Craiova and arrested.
The images which document the results of the search
carried out in Craiova speak for the young boy’s criminal
capacities: a net connected laptop, which was still
working on a chat-session, with a collection of computer
programs on CDs, well-catalogued together with a large
number of credit cards, and near his monitor … there
was a gun! In order to take the young ‘Olympic man’,
currently held in Como Prison, back to Craiova, the
Italian press report that ‘a powerful Romanian
information technology industrialist is taking action’.15
There is no further up-date at the time of writing this
article.
For the first time in a phishing case, the rules of the
Italian law16 that ratified the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, were applied.
Conviction
During December 2007, for the first time in Italy, Piero
Gamacchio, the judge for the preliminary hearing,
entered a verdict of guilty regarding two transnational
criminal associations accused of committing offences of
phishing. The main person that was responsible,
arrested by the Military Financial Police in Milan after an
escape attempt that lasted twelve hours, was sentenced
to imprisonment for six years. The penalty was
considerable, considering the accused decided to
accept the summary procedure, which provides that the
judge will decide the case on the basis of the
investigation, and therefore without hearing the
witnesses in court, but with a reduction of one third of
the penalty if found guilty.
After an investigation that lasted one year, in April
2008 we had the first verdict of guilt in respect of two
young Romanian men who were operating directly from
Romania as an important element in the criminal
12 I must here mention the sensitivity shown by
Ioana Albani, Chief Prosecutor of the Cybercrime
Unit at the General Prosecutor’s Office –
Investigative Direction for crimes of organized
crime and terrorism in Bucarest, as well as of the
Chief Prosecutor Daniela Matei and of the
Prosecutor Narcisa Danes. The investigation was
carried out by the General Inspector of the
Rumanian Police – Service for the contrast of IT
criminality, headed by Virgil Spiridon.
13 By virtue of article 6, paragraph 2 of the Italian
Criminal Code (Codice Penale), there is Italian
jurisdiction where the actions of the accused acted
in the pursuit of the crime were partly carried out in
Italy. In this respect, he obtained illegal accesses
into Italy technically through the internet into IT
systems that physically existed within the territory
of the State, from where he then ordered the later
transfers of money.
Art. 6 Reati commessi nel territorio dello Stato
Chiunque commette un reato nel territorio dello
Stato e’ punito secondo la legge italiana.
Il reato si considera commesso nel territorio dello
Stato, quando l’azione o l’omissione, che lo
costituisce, e’ ivi avvenuta in tutto o in parte,
ovvero si e’ verificato l’evento che e’ la
conseguenza dell’azione od omissione.
Art.6 crimes committed in the territory of the State
Anyone who commits a crime in the territory of the
State is punishable under Italian law.
The offense is considered committed in the
territory, where the action or the omission that
constitutes the offense, has occurred in whole or in
part, or is the consequence of the action or
omission.
14 At http://olimpiadi.info/oni2004/partecipanti/
partecipanti.htm but this URL is no longer active.
15 See P. Pioppi, ‘Tenta una serie di truffe in Rete
Genio dell’informatica arrestato’ (‘Tries to commit
a series of crimes on the net. IT Genie arrested’) in
Il Giorno, 17 June 2008; L. Grilli, ‘Como, mago della
truffa in cella Bucarest: liberatelo, è un genio’
(‘Como, genie of fraud in prison. Bucarest: free
him, he is a genius’) in Il Giornale, 18 July 2008.
Both articles are available at:
http://ilgiorno.ilsole24ore.com/como/2008/06/18/9
7804-tenta_serie_truffe_rete_genio_dell_
informatica_arrestato.shtml;
http://www.ilgiornale.it/a.pic1?ID=269857.
16 Legge 16 marzo 2006, n. 146, Ratifica ed
esecuzione della Convenzione e dei Protocolli delle
Nazioni Unite contro il crimine organizzato
transnazionale, adottati dall’Assemblea generale il
15 novembre 2000 ed il 31 maggio 2001
(pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 85 dell’11
aprile 2006 - Supplemento ordinario n. 91) (Law of
16 March 2006, n. 146, Ratification and
implementation of the Convention and Protocols of
the United Nations against Transnational
Organized Crime, adopted by the General
Assembly on 15 November 2000 and May 31 2001
(published in the Official Gazette n. 85 of 11 April
2006 - No Ordinary Supplement 91)).
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environment: they were arrested in Craiova at the end of
the year and extradited to Italy following the issuance of
a European Arrest Warrant. Both men faced identical
charges to those set out in footnote 10 above, and
received a sentence of thirty-seven months
imprisonment, a sentence that took into account their
youth and the fact that they were the only ones to
return a symbolic part of the money (5,000.00 euro
each),17 thanks to the financial contribution of their
respective families, payments were made to the
customers of the banks, rather than to the banks.
An important aspect for the success of the
prosecution was to simplify the technical evidence to
help the two judges (Guido Salvini and Piero
Gamacchio) understand the nature of the evidence. The
judges are among the most authoritative in the court in
Milan, because they have experience of dealing with a
number of significant trials, including trails against the
mafia and in relation to Italian terrorism. The judgment
comprises 150 pages, the counts on the indictment
occupying the first fifty pages.18
Lessons
Finally, it will be useful to underline a few final remarks.
First is what I call the agile cooperation model between
the police force and legal authorities, which also
happens in real time and is therefore capable of
improving the efficiency of the investigation. This is
what happened in the Phish & Chip operation, partly
thanks to the role of Eurojust,19 which allowed an even
faster data exchange among the investigators. Second,
when dealing with cyber frauds, it is not only necessary
to use computers, but a strategy for investigation must
be considered. Traditional methods of investigation are
used, including: profiling the cybercrime, telephone
interceptions, lying in wait and money flow analysis.
Only after, and not before or instead of these methods,
can computers and other tools be used to further the
investigation.
Finally, I still remember the words of the ‘Olympic
champion’ during his last interrogation:
I did the activities so far described on my computer,
which I had in Craiova. I’ve never thought that in that
way I could be traced, as I used a program, free,
provided by America On Line and utilized to have
American On Line’s servers as proxy, so that all my
internet navigations were referable to an American IP.
Never say never. If the computers can be programmed
to remain silent, this does not very often happen with
the partners you share in such an adventure. Well,
reflecting on the film ‘The Italian Job’ as an amusing
allegory of the fight between evil and good, what really
counts is the investigative ability of the police and
prosecutor, more than the technical potential of
machines (to oppose the machines of the cyber
criminals). As investigators, we surely have less
powerful computers but, as for the rest, and as the
English singer Alesha Dixon has sung, ‘Italians do it
better’!
© Francesco Cajani, 2009
17 In two months they managed to withdraw
67,000.00 euro (only using Postepay cards).
Regarding the first association, the investigation
ascertained that almost 96,000.00 euro of illegal
recharges had taken place (of which 94,000.00
euro were withdrawn); in respect of Intesa flash
cards, more than 60,500.00 euro in illegal
recharges had taken place (almost all this was
withdrawn).
18 Sentence no. 2650/07 dated 10 December 2007,
filed on 29 March 2008. See the comment by
R.FLOR, Frodi identitarie e diritto penale (‘Identity
fraud and criminal law’) at http://www.penale.it/
page.asp?mode=1&IDPag=730.
19 During the investigation there were twelve
supplements of the first request of Mutual
Assistance dated March 2007, all of them were
executed in relatively a short time; also thanks to
the positive help given by Eurojust, in the person
of Carmen Manfredda, Deputy to the Italian
national representative, and of Elena Dinu, the
Romanian national representative.
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A space is not without law just because it 
is cyber 
In cyberspace, the traditional country borders are
cleared during the actions of the cyber criminal. The
borders return later, when the detectives try to trace the
actions of the criminal or terrorist, searching digital
evidence possibly left by the author, and so useful for
the investigation. The main problem (it is even a cultural
problem), is, as all detectives know, that cyberspace
favours the suspects. Each time a cyber crime is
reported across jurisdictions, it is necessary to ask the
States affected to collaborate with the investigation,
usually through a formal rogatory. Of greater
importance, are the businesses providing electronic
services with servers in another State, and whose
servers and services the criminal act has used in some
way. In theory, it is conceivable that a commercial entity
will be nimble in responding to a legitimate request
from another State to collaborate in tracking down a
criminal. But this does not happen. The commercial
sector moves at a far slower pace than our counterparts
across the world. Invariably, a barrier is immediately
erected to any request with the excuse that they cannot
help because it is not possible according to domestic
law. This is what usually happens in relation to the
electronic services provided by three of the most
important internet businesses: Google, Yahoo! and
Microsoft. The difficulty with intercepting the flow of
communications in reasonably short time is a general
problem, and it does not only apply to Skype.2
‘No server no law’ v ‘no server but law’ 
We more often find ourselves dealing with opinions that
differ. On the one side, there is the ‘no server no law’
view. Preference is given to the geographical location
where the web servers are based: and often, the servers
are outside the European Community. This is the case in
respect of Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft. This first point
of view considers that national or European laws cannot
be enforced because the web servers are in the United
States of America. Of interest, regarding Skype, the
servers could not be precisely identified (and therefore
not intercepted), since they are organized as peer-to-
peer nodes. On the other side, there is the opinion that I
prefer, the ‘no server but law’ opinion. This view
considers that the crucial point is the geographical
location where the web services are offered, no matter
where the web servers are, even for the purposes of law
enforcement. As I usually say, the server may be
elsewhere, but the mouse is in Italy.
By Francesco Cajani
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ARTICLE:
1 This article is adapted from the speech of the
author at the First Strategic Meeting on Cybercrime
organised by Eurojust in Athens, 23-24 October
2008 (many thanks to Luisa and Valeria Viganò for
the review). For the press release, see
http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press_releases/200
8/30-10-2008.htm.
2 Declan McCullagh, ‘Skype: We can’t comply with
police wiretap requests’, cnet news, 9 June 2008,
available at http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-
9963028-38.html.
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Three scenarios
Essentially, there are three scenarios that affect the
investigation of alleged crimes that include the use of
networked communications. They can overlap, but the
three that we need to consider can be divided into the
availability of encrypted communication technology, the
communication channel and communication data. Each
are considered in turn below. The Italian law regulates
each scenario in a different way, and there are no
reported decisions in relation to these matters at the
time of writing. An important problem regarding each of
these is also the length of time the data is retained.
The availability of encrypted communication
technology
In the case of Skype and other Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) communications generally, the
communication is encrypted. It is only possible to
intercept a VoIP communication only when the
investigating authority knows the exact location of the
suspect’s computer. The investigating authority will try
to obtain access to the computer and install a program
to enable interception to take place, and where it is not
possible to reach the computer physically, social
engineering techniques will be used to achieve the
same aim. Naturally, it is only possible to undertake
these actions with the authorization of a judge.
The availability of a communication channel 
The vast flow of communications between people is now
through e-mail systems. Often, the people under
investigation are present in Italy, but they might use an
e-mail system based abroad, such as Google or
Microsoft: this occurs frequently, hence the reference to
the ‘no server no law’ opinion. In fact it was not possible
in this case to enforce an order issued by the judge. The
order that could not be enforced, requested that the e-
mail accounts be intercepted by having the e-mail traffic
redirected to the judicial police account. This method
reduces costs, and permits the interception to begin
quickly. This method is used when making similar
requests to the national ISPs with servers in Italy. The
alternative mechanism is for the judicial police to notify
Google Italia or Microsoft Italia (both with registered
offices in Milan) of the interception order. However, their
response is to indicate that the servers are in the United
States of America, and they request a rogatory before
they will implement the interception order. This is not
good if the investigation concerns a murder or a
kidnapping. The situation is the same as with Skype – it
is almost impossible to intercept communications. Only
Yahoo! Italia (their registered office is in Milan) has an
item of software called ‘Yahoo! Account Management
Tool’. This software allows e-mail to be intercepted, but
it is of limited help.
The availability of communication data
This scenario refers to data relating to the use of the
internet, such as log files. In the experience of some
Italian investigation agencies, Microsoft Italia was the
first to provide – without a rogatory but only with a
request from the Italian Public Prosecutor – such data,
not only referred to @hotmail.it e-mail, but including
@hotmail.com. At first, Google Italia considered it was
necessary for a rogatory, but they changed their policy,
and now provide all the data requested, providing the
request is accompanied with an order from the Italian
Public Prosecutor (not only from the Italian Judicial
Police). Nevertheless, if an IP address (logged by the
Google electronic systems with regard to an e-mail
@gmail.com) is not related to an Italian server, Google
does not consider it is permitted to communicate it to
the Italian Judicial Authority. In comparison, Yahoo! Italia
request a rogatory, but only in some cases.
Preliminary matters
In order to be better prepared to investigate alleged
crimes, investigators have had to assemble lists of
relevant information in relation to each Internet service
provider (ISP), including: where the web servers are
physically located; where the registered office of the ISP
is located, and if the ISP has an operating branch in the
State where the investigation is conducted. It is also
necessary to know (in order to verify potential criminal
liability) if the employees in the operating branches are
in effective control of the local affairs of the ISP, or
whether they are mere legal representatives.
Jurisdiction analysis as applied in the
United States of America 
If the ‘no server no law’ opinion is accepted, it will be
interesting to know what view an American judge would
take. The scenario is as follows: the ISP is an American
company which also has a physical base in Europe and
offers its services to European citizens; the ISP insists
that their web servers are in one of the US states, for
example in California, and as a result, the ISP is not
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subject to the laws of the Member State in which they
have an office. The same could be argued in reverse. An
Italian ISP uses the identical argument to a Federal
court in the US, that is: ‘sorry, but our servers are in
Italy’. Or, the same American company with servers in
California summoned in a different US Court (for
example: Arizona). It is debatable whether a US judge
will accept such an argument. Consider how the judges
in the US analyse internet jurisdiction.3 Judges in the US
have developed two general lines of analysis in
determining whether jurisdiction can be exercised in
cases involving internet activity. The first, a ‘sliding
scale’ approach, seeks to classify the ‘nature and
quality’ of the commercial activity, if any, that the
defendant conducts over the internet.4 The second
analysis, called the ‘effects test’, seeks to determine to
what extent a defendant’s intentional conduct takes
place outside the forum State.5 So, for a number of
years, the US state courts have been using an
undisputed analysis, providing for US jurisdiction, even
if the web site is based on a server in another country.
This means that a foreign internet entrepreneur,
although lacking ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts
with any US forum state sufficient to subject him or her
to general jurisdiction, may nonetheless be subject to
personal jurisdiction in the US based on two broad
theories of ‘specific’ personal jurisdiction. Under the
Zippo ‘sliding scale’ analysis, a US court will classify the
‘nature and quality’ of any commercial activity that is
conducted over the internet and place it on a continuum
ranging from ‘passive’, where no business is conducted,
to ‘clearly conducting business’. The closer the internet
activities are to ‘clearly conducting business’, the more
likely that a US court will exercise personal jurisdiction.
Courts may also apply the Calder ‘effects test’ to
determine whether the intentional conduct of the party
was calculated to cause harm to the plaintiff within the
forum state. Where a defendant ‘purposefully directs’
his activities towards the jurisdiction, he may be liable
to legal action for any injury relating to or arising from
those activities.
Obligations and national laws to observe 
At this point, the important question is to identify the
obligations and national laws that we can be expected
to observe. In Italy, the provisions of Decreto legislativo
1° agosto 2003, n. 259, Codice delle comunicazioni
elettroniche6 (Legislative Decree of 1st August 2003, n.
259 electronic communication rules) are fundamental.
These rules have their origin in four EC Directives.7 An
important step has been taken by the Italian Ministero
dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic
Development and Telecommunication), in that it has
recently provided a written opinion (note of 12
September 2008, following a specific request of the
Direzione Nazionale Antimafia) according to which
Skype connections must be included in the electronic
communication rules and are therefore subject to the
general authorization provided by the law.
Consequently this involves the observance of the
rules about the compulsory services required by the
judicial authority and, in particular, to enable a legal
interception to take place by competent national
authorities, as also set out in article 6 of EC Directive
2002/20/EC, the Authorisation Directive:
3 G. J. H. Smith, Internet law and regulation, (Sweet
and Maxwell, 3rd edition, 2002), 347-349.
4 Zippo Manufacturing Co. v Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.1997).
5 Calder v Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
6 Pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale n.214 del 15
settembre 2003.
7 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to,
and interconnection of, electronic communications
networks and associated facilities (Access
Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 7; Directive
2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of
electronic communications networks and services
(Authorisation Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p.
21; Directive 2002/21/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a
common regulatory framework for electronic
communications networks and services (“the
Framework Directive”), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33;
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal
service and users’ rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services (Universal
Service Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 51.
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Article 6
Conditions attached to the general authorisation and
to the rights of use for radio frequencies and for
numbers, and specific obligations
1. The general authorisation for the provision of
electronic communications networks or services and
the rights of use for radio frequencies and rights of
use for numbers may be subject only to the
conditions listed respectively in parts A, B and C of
the Annex. Such conditions shall be objectively
justified in relation to the network or service
concerned, non-discriminatory, proportionate and
transparent
The relevant condition listed in the Annex is item 11:
11. Enabling of legal interception by competent
national authorities in conformity with Directive
97/66/EC and Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data.
The combination of article 6 and paragraph 11 of the
Annex could mean: if, for instance, in the future Skype
decides to open a branch in Italy, this will be sufficient
market conditions to enable Italian investigating
authorities to require Skype to intercept
communications if ordered so to do.
Secondly, we could expect the observance of the data
retention rules (Decreto legislativo 30 maggio 2008, n.
109 – Legislative Decree of 30 May 2008, n. 109).8 The
provisions of articles 3 and 6 of Directive 2006/24/EC
are relevant, and provide as follows:
Article 3
Obligation to retain data
1. By way of derogation from Articles 5, 6 and 9 of
Directive 2002/58/EC, Member States shall adopt
measures to ensure that the data specified in Article 5
of this Directive are retained in accordance with the
provisions thereof, to the extent that those data are
generated or processed by providers of publicly
available electronic communications services or of a
public communication network within their
jurisdiction in the process of supplying the
communications services concerned.
2. The obligation to retain data provided for in
paragraph 1 shall include the retention of the data
specified in Article 5 relating to unsuccessful call
attempts where those data are generated or
processed, and stored (as regards elephony data) or
logged (as regards Internet data), by providers of
publicly available electronic communications services
or of a public communications network within the
jurisdiction of the Member State concerned in the
process of supplying the communication services
concerned. This Directive shall not require data
relating to unconnected calls to be retained.
Article 6
Periods of retention
Member States shall ensure that the categories of
data specified in Article 5 are retained for periods of
not less than six months and not more than two years
from the date of the communication.
It is clearly the opinion of Peter Schaar, President of the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, that any EC
rules can be applied to the organizations that turn their
attention to provide services to European citizens:
‘Although Google’s headquarters are based in the
United States, Google is under legal obligation to
comply with European laws, in particular privacy laws,
as Google’s service are provided to European citizens
and it maintains data processing activities in Europe,
especially the processing of personal data that takes
place at its European centre’9
It therefore follows that the obligations of data retention
also apply to Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft.
Finally, it is to be observed that the United States of
America ratified the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime (Budapest, 23.XI.2001) on 29 September
8 Based on Directive 2006/24/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on
the retention of data generated or processed in
connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public
communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13/04/2006 P. 0054 – 0063.
9 Letter from Peter Schaar to Peter Fleischer dated 16
May 2007, D(2007) 6016, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/news/
docs/pr_google_16_05_07_en.pdf.
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2006, which provides for two precise obligations of
cooperation in articles 33 and 34:
Article 33 – Mutual assistance regarding the real-time
collection of traffic data
1 The Parties shall provide mutual assistance to each
other in the real-time collection of traffic data
associated with specified communications in their
territory transmitted by means of a computer system.
Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, this
assistance shall be governed by the conditions and
procedures provided for under domestic law.
2 Each Party shall provide such assistance at least
with respect to criminal offences for which real-time
collection of traffic data would be available in a
similar domestic case.
Article 34 – Mutual assistance regarding the
interception of content data
The Parties shall provide mutual assistance to each
other in the real-time collection or recording of
content data of specified communications transmitted
by means of a computer system to the extent
permitted under their applicable treaties and
domestic laws.
Therefore, when a State such as Italy ratifies the
Convention,10 specific duties arise. As the ancient
Romans said, and as the rules of international law
remind us: agreements must be kept (pacta sunt
servanda).
In particular, whereas US ISPs continue to consider
that EU laws do not apply to them, the national judicial
authorities will continue to act within the law in a
reasonable and proper way11 and will insist for an
action12 not only of the European administrative
authorities, of the US authorities, even if it is necessary
to enforce the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime.
Yahoo! Italia and the Public Prosecutor’s
Office in Milan
In 2007, the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Milan had
some difficulty with Yahoo! Italia around the ‘Net
Citizenship’ concept. That is: when an Italian user
registers an account from the webpage www.yahoo.it,
he can choose which law his e-mail correspondence will
be subject to. There is an item of software called Yahoo!
Account Management Tool, which is used by all the
Yahoo! branches. It returns the communications stored
in e-mail boxes (@yahoo.it and @yahoo.com or both),
but only in respect of those users that agree that Italian
law applies. The investigation authorities can intercept
these e-mails, even without a rogatory. However, these
e-mails only have a retention period of between 30 and
45 days, against a period of twelve months.13 As a result,
some investigations suffer. One occasion, a Yahoo! mail
box was the subject of interception without any results.
This meant that no e-mails were received at all. The
investigators could see that no e-mails were received.
The suspect, a Romanian phisher, was arrested. He
provided the access credentials to the mail box that had
been intercepted. It was discovered that there were a
number of messages that had been received in the
period when the mail box had been subjected to
interception. During the period the mail box was the
subject of interception, a great number of Yahoo!
employees were free to enter the Yahoo! Account
Management Tool from several of the European
branches of Yahoo! This fact could damage the users’
privacy, and not only the police investigation. The
indictment was transferred to the Garante per la
protezione dei dati personali (Italian Privacy Authority),
who confirmed the technical investigation and that the
10 The Convention was signed by Italy on 23
November 2001, ratified on 5 June 2008, in force on
1 October 2008; Legge 18 marzo 2008, n. 48
Ratifica ed esecuzione della Convenzione del
Consiglio d’Europa sulla criminalità informatica,
fatta a Budapest il 23 novembre 2001, e norme di
adeguamento dell’ordinamento interno
(Pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale 4 aprile 2008,
n. 80; s.o. n. 79) (Law of 18 March 2008, n. 48).
11 On 2 March 2009, a court in Dendermonde,
Belgium, found Yahoo guilty of withholding
personal account information linked to Yahoo e-
mail addresses. This decision is in the process of
being appealed. Note from the editor: it is
antipicated that a full report on this case will be
included in the 2010 issue of the journal.
12 According to Article 10 of Directive 2006/24/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or
processed in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC OJl L 105,
13/04/2006 P. 0054 - 0063, ‘Member States shall
ensure that the Commission is provided on a yearly
basis with statistics on the retention of data
generated or processed in connection with the
provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or a public
communications network. Such statistics shall
include … the cases where requests for data could
not be met’. See also Decreto legislativo 30
maggio 2008, n. 109, which provides fees from
50,000.00 to 150,000.00 euros for failing to retain
data for 12 months.
13 In accordance with Directive 2006/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 on the retention of data generated or
processed in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105,
13/04/2006 P. 0054 – 0063; implemented by
Decreto legislativo 30 maggio 2008, n. 109.
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legal approach taken by us was correct. Meanwhile, the
attorneys for Yahoo! Italia indicated to the Public
Prosecutor’s Office in Milan that the company would
spontaneously conform to Decreto legislativo 30 maggio
2008, n. 109, by storing log files for twelve months in
future.14 Apparently this will be enforced across all EC
states, and started from 21 November 2007. In my
opinion, it could not be different: we are in presence of
societies which must be included in the provisions of
article 3 of Directive 2002/58/EC:15
Article 3
Services concerned
1. This Directive shall apply to the processing of
personal data in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications services
in public communications networks in the Community.
It is for such reasons, and independently from where the
servers are physically located, they are required to
comply with the obligations of the Italian and EC data
retention rules.
Concluding comments
In conclusion, let me take a strictly personal view: each
time I manage to come to Athens, I like to have a walk
through the Agorà and go as far as the Monument of the
Eponymous Heroes: this is the place where the
legislation, decrees and announcements were shown,
so that the Athenian citizens could see and know them.
Well, today we have a lot of ‘shown’ laws, yet there are
many people who pretend not to see them, hiding
behind a ‘cyberspace virtuality’. But this very
cyberspace not only feeds such companies with their
profits, but facilitates crime. There is a need to balance
the rights of people that are the victims of a crime,
against the econimics of the ISPs. The words by which
the historian Herodotus of Halicarnassus described
what Demaratos said of the Lacedemonians are
relevant:16
‘So also the Lacedemonians are not inferior to any
men when fighting one by one, and they are the best
of all men when fighting in a body: for though free,
yet they are not free in all things, for over them is set
Law as a master, whom they fear much more even
than thy people fear thee. It is certain at least that
they do whatsoever that master commands; and he
commands ever the same thing, that is to say, he bids
them not flee out of battle from any multitude of men,
but stay in their post and win the victory or lose their
life.’
Many commentators have seen in this affirmation the
first statement of that ‘Government of the Law’,
according to which the existence of a law distinguished
the Greeks from the non-Greeks, and for this reason
defined ‘barbarians’: therefore, in those times, for the
Greeks:17
Du Démarate d’Hérodote au Platon de la lettre VII, en
passant par le Thésée d’Euripide, la tradition est bien
la même. Elle implique un sens aigu de cette loi
comune que les citoyens avaient su se donner et dont
ils attendaient à la fois le bon ordre et la liberté. Pour
eux, déja, la liberté se définissait comme l’obéissance
aux lois.
Of Démarate from Herodotus to Plato of letter VII,
while passing by Theseus of Euripides, the tradition is
the same. It implies an acute sense of this common
law that the citizens had known to be given and from
which they expected to both order and freedom. For
them, freedom is already defined as obedience to the
laws.
Today, we often talk about the internet as a space of
freedom. As a Public Prosecutor, who is fond of
information technologies, my wish and my hope is that
this ‘freedom’ can really come true. The danger of a
different concept of freedom, meant as the absence of
laws, is a barbarity to be opposed.
© Francesco Cajani, 2009
14 The Request for Archiving (not to prosecute and to
close the case) was submitted to the court on 16
October 2008, and agreed by the judge, Dr
Gaetano Brusa, on 25 March 2009. The Request is
published at the end of this article.
15 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector
(Directive on privacy and electronic
communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47.
16 The Histories, VII, 104. (Translation of G. C.
Macaulay, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/
files/2456/2456-h/book7.htm).
17 Jacqueline de Romilly, La loi dans le pensèe
grecque, (1971, Belles letters, Paris), 23.
Francesco Cajani is a Deputy Public Prosecutor in the High Tech
Crime Unit at the Court of Law in Milan. He is also member of
the Technical and Scientific Committee of IISFA (International
Information Systems Forensics Association) – Italy Chapter
(http://www.iisfa.eu).
francesco.cajani@giustizia.it
